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Summary findings
Jack studies the allocation-between  a central  (This way, if ex post bargaining breaks down, each still
government and a local authority-of  responsibility for  enjoys some benefits from the other's actions.)
planning, financing, and operations for the delivery of  *  Financing authority and responsibility for delivering
health services, in the context  of an incomplete contracts  services should be negatively correlated. Generally it is
model. In this model, inputs are required of both the  optimal to allocate tax authority to the party that values
central government and local authorities but they are  the residents' well-being less-in  other words, separate
unable to write down, and commit to, a complete and  spending responsibility (ownership) from financing
binding contract describing the actions both should take.  authority. A heavier financing burden (access  to a small
The model is meant to capture the tradeoff between  and inefficient tax base) has the same incentive effect as
central and local authority in decisions about both  asset ownership: It increases the return to effort.
financing and the provision of services. Each party  *  If transferring ownership of the physical asset is
provides a specific input-for  example, the central  costly (because the party that builds the asset has an
government establishes a drug procurement system while  inherent advantage in operating it-that  is, there is some
the local authority designs and implements an incentive  human capital embodiment), it may be optimal for the
scheme to get doctors to carry out their responsibilities  party with the higher construction  costs to have planning
appropriately. The responsibility for delivery of services  authority.
is identified with the ownership of essential  *  Somewhat paradoxically, the greater the costs of
infrastructure,  such as the clinic or hospital.  transferring assets from one party to the other,  the more
Jack finds that to maximize the joint surplus of the two  likely that ownership of the facilities and their provision
public bodies:  should be separated.
- Ownership of the facility should be given to the
party that most values the well-being of local residents.
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Poor countries face obvious resource constraints  on all dimensions of consumption  and investment,
including those  in the  health  sector.  However, by the  same token, estimates  have suggested  that
relatively small resource allocations  could have not inconsiderable effects on  health  outcomes  and
welfare. For example, the  World Bank  (1993, p.  106) estimated  a basic package of care would cost
low income developing countries in the  vicinity of US$4 per capita  (1.2% of GDP),  and would cost
middle income countries US$7 per capita  (just 0.3% of GDP).
If effective health care is so cheap, why has so little progress been made in addressing the appalling
living conditions and  health  status  of poor  people in the  developing world?  The  answer must  be
that  the  resources available are not used  efficiently or  equitably, despite  (or sometimes because of)
the  objectives of government.  Of course, it has  long been well established  that  the  organization  of
the  delivery of health  care is highly non-trivial,  as the  often delicate  balance  between  equity  and
efficiency concerns under  conditions of risk, market  failure, and  asymmetric  information  is struck.
Indeed,  the  question  of why  public  spending  has  been relatively  ineffectual  in improving  health
indicators  in developing countries has  recently been  empirically investigated  by Filmer,  Hammer,
and  Pritchett  (1998), who  identify incentive  constraints  on the  public  sector's  ability  to  provide
services. 1
One response that  has been  adopted  recently  in many  developing countries,  often with  World
Bank  support,  is to  decentralize  the  provision of health  (and  other  social)  services, in the  hope
that  local governments will use resources more efficiently. In particular,  it is hoped that  lower level
autonomy  over health  care provision can  lead to  enhanced  allocative  efficiency (better  matching
services provided  to  those  required/demanded)  and  to  greater  production  efficiency, such  as  by
ensuring  compliance by providers with government requirements  (e.g., showing up for work).  This
paper  examines a simple application  of recent  ideas from the  theory of the  firm to the  question of
IThey  also identify the possibility that  public spending might crowd out  private supply, so the net effect on
utilization can be small.
1the allocation  of authority  in the  delivery of health  services.
The model I  will write down here is meant  to capture  the  trade-off  between  central  and  local
authority  over decisions regarding  both  provision of services and  financing.  I  assume  that  both
parties - the central  and  local governments - have something to contribute  to the efficient provision
of health  services. Thus even in a decentralized  regime, the centre  has some role to play (organizing
national  coordination,  providing national  public good  inputs  into  health  production,  acting  as  a
potential  source of financing); and  conversely, in a centralized  arrangement,  the  local  authority  is
active, perhaps  acting  as a monitor and/or  regulator  of physician  behavior.
Orthodox  discussion of decentralization  concentrates  on things  like interjurisdictional  externali-
ties and national public goods, versus local information  about preferences and production  techniques
(Oates  (1999)).  It  can be argued  that  these characteristics  do not  get  to the  heart  of the  decen-
tralization  question,  which is about  how decision authority  should be allocated.  Externalities  can
be  fixed with  taxes  and  subsidies,  or  through  Coasean  bargaining,  for example,  and  information
asymmetries point to delegation of tasks, but not necessarily decentralization  of authority.  Some of
the more formal analysis of decentralization  has employed the principal-agent  paradigm in analyzing
the design of contractual  relationships  between central  and  local government.  There  are  a number
of shortcomings with this approach however. First,  the allocation of tasks  between the two parties is
exogenous, 2 so a principal question of decentralization  - who should do what  - is difficult to address
in this  framework.  Second, by their  nature,  many of the  tasks  that  are  to be  performed,  and  the
underlying objectives,  are difficult to describe, particularly  in the social sectors.  This makes writing
formal contracts  between central and local governments difficult at best.  And third,  it might be rela-
tively easy for a central  government to renege on specific aspects of a contract  (e.g., revenue sharing
formulae),  yielding finely-tuned  contracts  open  to  future  renegotiation.  I  will assume  that  more
robust aspects of intergovernmental  relations  (in particular  asset ownership and tax  base authority)
2Holmstrom  and  Milgrom  (1987 and  1991) examine  which  tasks  an agent  should  be required  to  do  (or  prohibited
from doing),  but  do not  assign  tasks  between  principal  and agent.
2are less susceptible to arbitrary  alteration  by the central  powers. 3
Within the realm of principal-agent models, probably the most useful question to ask is not what
the  optimal contract  between the principal (central government) and  agent (local authority)  should
be, but more basically who should the principal be? That  is, is it better to have a central government
bureaucrat,  answerable to a central ministry, monitor the behavior  of a service provider, or to have
a  local politician  answerable  to  the  local population  perform  this  function?  This  is the  issue of
accountability.  The answer will depend on the  importance  of externalities  etc., and  on the  extent
to which the  local population  can control its  politicians  (strength  of local democracy,  likelihood of
capture,  etc.).  Accountability  to the  population  is somewhat more indirect  in the  centralized case
(the  bureaucrat  is accountable  to  the  minister,  who, as part  of the  government,  is accountable  to
the  national  population)  than  in the  decentralized  case, although  it is not clear  a priori  that  there
is more accountability  under the  latter regime.4
One can understand  issues of accountability  as determining  the extent  to which the objectives of
local and  central governments coincide with some notion of aggregate social welfare, as judged by an
objective outside  observer.  Whatever  the  degree of convergence of these objectives,  there  remains
the task  of coordinating the  actions of the two parties.  This is the subject  of this  paper.
Given these  observations  and  concerns, I  will employ a  simple incomplete  contracts  model  of
decentralization.  I  borrow extensively from Hart's  (1995) model of vertical  integration,  although
there  are  some differences that  arise due  to the  fact  that  health  outputs  represent  a  public  good
that  is valued by both  levels of government.  The essence of Hart's  analysis  is that,  absent  formal
incentive contracts, ownership of assets used in production  can provide incentives, and the allocation
of ownership rights  determines  aggregate surplus,  through  its  effects on incentives.  In  turn,  these
3This  requires  some kind  of well-functioning  court  system.  Governments  can  and  do nationalize  whole industries,
often counter  to guarantees  of non-intervention.  In the health  sector  this  would appear  to be less likely, as it is usually
not  a great  revenue  generator.
'See  Seabright  (1998)  for  an incomplete  contracts  model  of accountability  within  a  decentralized  economy.  Also
Bardhan  and Mookherjee  (1998)  use an incomplete  contracts  approach  to  model  local  capture  of politicians.
3incentives derive from  the  inevitable  ex post  renegotiation  of any  existing  contract  between  two
parties,  and  the  fact that  outside options  (which are  a function  of asset  holdings) determine  each
party's  bargaining power.  In the  context  of the organization  of government provided services, the
allocation of decision making authority  (which is like asset ownership) determines  incentives and the
net  equilibrium welfare improvement, or quality of care.
More specifically, I will assume that  production  of medical care and related  services requires three
invested (i.e., sunk) inputs.  The first can be thought  of as a physical capital  good, K  > 0, such as
a clinic/hospital  and  associated equipment.  This capital good can be provided by either  the central
government (G) or  the local authority  (A).  The other  two inputs  are eG > 0 and  eA > 0, and  can
be provided only by the  central  government and  the  local authority,  respectively.  eG  is something
like a drug  procurement  and  distribution  network,  and  eA is a  local organization  and  monitoring
system for inducing physicians to perform.5 A time line is shown in Figure  1.
There is no question, in this  model, about  which party  should perform the  functions  eG and  eA.
The questions I want to address are (i) who should own the facility, K, (ii) who should have financing
authority,  and  (iii) who should build  the  facility?  There  are  thus  three  types  of decentralization
possible in this  model, depending on the  answers to these questions:  decentralized  ownership, fiscal
decentralization  (specific to the  project),  and  decentralized  provision.  One of the  contributions  of
the paper  is to examine the  conditions under which these three aspects of decentralization  should go
together.  For example,  ownership of K  can provide incentives for provision of eG and  eA. Because
of this, the identities of the owner and builder of K  may differ, and  it is not always the  case that  the
most efficient provider of the physical asset should build it.  This helps formalize ideas of participation
and the importance  of "local ownership" in project  design, and  helps identify the trade-offs between
such benefits and the  associated  costs.
5In the  standard  theory  of the  firm model,  eG and eA would  be interpreted  as human  capital  investements  by  each
of two  interacting  parties.  The essential  feature  of eG and  eA is  that  their  ownership  cannot  be  allocated  arbitrarily
to  one party  or the  other,  and  that  only  the  party  that  invests  in  each can  "own"  it.
4Alocate responsibilities  and nghts
(i) Hospital  built  by i
(ii) Hospital  owned byj
(iii) Tax  authority  given to k
l
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IJoug  surplus  realized  and  dividedl
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Figure  1:
The analysis can be done in two parts.  First,  I assume the existence of a physical asset, K, and
ask who should own it, and how financing should be arranged.  Then,  working backwards,  I address
the  question of who should build it.  The next  section sets up the  structure  of the  model.  Section
3 looks at  ownership of  K,  the  following section  looks at  tax  assignment  within the  incomplete
contract  model. Section 5 simplifies the  underlying structure  of the model in order to examine who
should provide K, and  section 6 draws some conclusions.
2  Technology  and  Preferences
2.1  Quality
The three assets K,  eG, and eA  can be combined with fixed supplies of other inputs  (e.g., doctors,
drugs, etc.)  to produce health services. 6 If they are used jointly and cooperatively by the two parties,
then the quality of services is ',(eG, eA, K).  On the other hand, if the  parties do not cooperate, then
6Having  fixed supplies  of recurrent  inputs  makes it easy to  talk  about  quality  and cost  differences  independently.
5ownership of K matters.  For example, if G owns the physical asset, then it can try to provide medical
care using K  and  eG, but not  eA.  At the  same time,  A can provide some services using just  the
input  eA. We denote the net  effect of these two independent means of provision by OG  (eG, eA, K).
If on the  other hand  the local authority  owns the  physical asset, then  under non-cooperation  it can
use K  and eA to produce services,  while G uses  just eG, yielding  net quality IPA(eG, eA, K).  T,  OG,
and O  A are assumed to be increasing and concave in each of their  arguments.
We also assume that  access to the  asset K  improves the absolute  and  marginal productivity  of
efforts. That  is, for i = G and A,
q'(eG, eA, K)  > Oi(eG  ,  eA  , K),
and
I'l(eG,  eA, K)  >  (eG, eA, K)  >,OA (eG, eA, K),  and
q'2 (eG , eA , K)  > VfiA  (eG , eA , K)  > OG  (eG , eA , K) .
where the  subscript denotes the  partial derivative with respect to the relevant argument.  To ensure
existence of interior optima,  I assume also that  I  jj I  >  IJVb  I for j  = 1, 2.
2.2  Cost
Using the  assets K,  eG and  eA is costly (drugs have to be  purchased,  doctors paid,  and  buildings
maintained).  Cooperation  has an effect on these costs of provision just  as it does on quality.  Under
cooperation, operating  costs are given by the function r(eG, eA, K).  If the parties do not cooperate,
each operates  those assets  under its control separately, and total costs are
lyG(eG, eA, K)  =17G(eG, K)  + 77A(eA,  °)
if G owns the facility, and
.yA(eG, eA, K)  =?7A(eA, K)  + 7G(eG,  )
6if A does. r1i  is the stand-alone  cost that  party i must finance in operating the assets it has under its
control.  It is assumed that  effort and access to the physical asset both reduce a party's  stand-alone
costs, i.e., that7
877i  < O  and  a>K  <  .
In addition,  it is assumed that  the  productivity  of effort in reducing costs is increasing in the  level
of the physical asset available, i.e.,
OeiaK
In particular, lani(ei,  K) /aej j > JOij(ej,  O)1aejj,  so owning  the asset makes  own  effort more  produc-
tive.
We again assume that  cooperation is good in both senses:
r(eG, eA, K)  <  y'(eG,  eA, K)
and
lr3(ec,eA,K)l  >  [Yi(eG,eA,  K)|
Again, to ensure existence, it is assumed that  lrjj  I  > [-3j  |. Thus cooperation lowers operating costs,
and  increases the  cost reduction  associated with  an increase in each of the  assets  K,  eG, and  eA.
For example, a higher level of eG might correspond to a better  drug procurement and  management
system that  reduces drug waste.  This would mean that  fewer drugs would need to be purchased to
attain  a given quality of service (or that  their prices would fall), lowering operating  costs.
2.3  Consumer  welfare
Quality is taken  as a proxy measure for the benefits consumers receive from the  services provided.
I assume  also that  the  consumers finance the  costs of provision through  tax  payments,  (possibly
7  Recall that  these  costs  represent  the  costs of other  inputs  purchased  in  order  to  provide  a fixed level of services.
It  is therefore  uncontroversial  that  higher levels of inputs  of effort and  K  reduce  the  requirements  for other  inputs,
and hence the  unit  cost that  needs  to  be financed.
7including user fees). The two levels of government have different taxes bases, the  marginal distor-
tionary  costs of which are AG  and AA  respectively. Under cooperation, the more efficient tax  base is
used. Consumer well being in this  case is
W* (eG, eA, K)  =  !(eG,  eA, K)  - (1 +  Amin)r(eG, eA, K)  (1)
where Amin  min{AG,  AA}.  In the non-cooperative regimes, consuner  well-being is
W
0(eG, eA,  K)  = 
0 (eG,  eA,  K)  - [(1  +  AG)97G(eG,  K)  + (1 +  AA)VA(eA,  0)]  (2)
under G-ownership, and
WA(eG,  eA,  K)  =  O  (ea,  eA,  K)  - [(1 +  AA)?7A(eA,  K)  + (1 + Ao)r7a(ea,  0)]  (3)
under A-ownership.
Our assumptions above on the effects of K on the productivity  of effort in reducing stand-alone
costs imply that
WI  (eG,  eA,  K)  >  WfG(ea,  eA,  K)  >  WA  (eG,  eA,  K)  (4)
and
W2  (eGa, eA,  K)  >  W2  A(ea,  eA,  K)  >  W(eG  eA,  K).  (5)
2.4  Government  objectives
The two governments care about two things:  (i) the well-being of consumers (although  to possibly
different extents),  and  (ii) the  non-pecuniary  costs  associated  with  their  investment  choices  (effort
costs). 8 Thus, G's objective, given K  is
UG(eG,  eA,  K)  =  #GW(eG,  eA,  K)  -eG
8I abstract  from issues of inter-jurisdictional  externalities,  that  may be internalized  by  the central  government  but
not  by the  local authority.
8where W(.) = W*(.),  WG(.),  or WA(.).  Similarly, A's objective is
UA(eG,  eA, K) = PAW(ea,  eA, K)  - eA.
We normalize the  parties'  preference  weights so that  OG +  /3A  =  1,  and  interpret  3G  >  3A  as
describing a situation  in which the  local authority  is less responsive to residents'  desires than  is the
central government, say due  to capture  by the  local elite.  On the  other hand,  fG  <  3 A  represents
the  case where a far away central  government is less responsive to local needs.
Having supplied efforts eG and eA, the total  surplus generated  is [3GW + ,3AW.  Under coopera-
tion, this is just  W*(eG, eA, K), while under non-cooperative i-ownership it amounts to Wi(eG,  eA, K),
for i = G and  A.
3  Optimal  asset  ownership
Given the  existence of a physical asset, K,  who should own it?  To answer this  we just  compare the
gross surplus  (as calculated  by the  two governments) that  will be generated  under the  two possible
ownership structures  - C-ownership and  A-ownership.
If the parties  could contract  on eG and  eA, then  the first-best  outcome could be achieved - that
is, ea and eA would be chosen to maximize W*, and this aggregate surplus would be shared between
the two in some fashion depending on the division of ex ante bargaining power.  However each party
recognizes that  when such contracts  are not  feasible (or enforceable), then  ex post bargaining  will
mean  that  at  least  some  of the  returns  to  its  effort  will be  shared  with  the  other  player.  This
reduces incentives to  provide effort, and  the  optimal  ownership allocation  is such  as  to minimize
these distortions.  We take the  standard  approach  and  assume that  ex post Nash bargaining  results
in a 50:50 split of the  gains from cooperation.
Exactly how the implied transfer from one party to the other associated with  splitting the  gains
from  trade is effected is not  modeled here explicitly.  One possibility  is that  this  transfer  is imple-
mented  implicitly through  adjustments  to existing inter-governmental  grants,  or that  responsibility
9for provision of other public services is reallocated  between the  parties.
3.1  G-ownership
3.1.1  Payoffs
Under  G-ownership, suppressing all functional dependencies  for convenience, the  gains from trade
are
XG  =  W*-  WG
At the ex post bargaining  stage, effort costs are sunk, so the payoff to G is thus
7G  =dWG  +  IXG
=  2W*  +  A\WG
where A4  = o,-  IA,  and  we have used ,(iG + /3A  =  1. The first term  in the  first line is G's payoff
if bargaining  breaks down. 9 Similarly, A's ex post payoff under G-ownership  is
rG  =  IAWG  +  ±XG A  2
1  W*  1A,3WG
2  2
Notice that  if both governments give consumer welfare the same weight (fiG =  ,'A), then  7r=  G  r=
IW*,  reflecting that  any  benefit that  accrues to consumers represents a pure  public good vis-&-vis
the two governments.
3.1.2  Effort  choices
The ex interim payoff to G under  G-ownership is 7rG  - eG, 10 and its  choice of effort satisfies
IW1*  +I 2AWG  = 1.  (6)
9Notice that we have assumed that even if bargaining breaks down, so that  both parties provide services indepen-
dently, Gs utility depends on the total quality delivered to, and costs imposed on, residents, 'pG  and  yG,  respectively,
and not just on the quality it provides and the costs it imposes.
'°Ex  interim because K  has been sunk at this stage.
10Similarly, A's payoff under  G-ownership is 7rG  - eA,  and its  effort choice satisfies
2W2 -12APW  =  (7)
Note that  since IAflI  <  1, our convexity assumptions  on the  'T/,0  and P/-  functions guarantee  that
the  second order  conditions are both  satisfied."  Denote the  optimal effort  choices of G and  A by
eG and eAG  respectively.  These effort choices will in general be  functions of the  size (quality)  of the
existing physical capital asset,  K,  but  we suppress  such dependence for now.  When fG  = OA, (6)
and  (7) simplify to
IW-  = 1  (8)
2
and
1W2  = 1  (9)
2
In this case, although  the  resulting effort choices are not first-best (that  would require  W,* = 1, for
i =  1, 2), they are independent  of asset ownership.
The total  ex post  surplus  thus generated  from  G-ownership is W*(e,  ,eA,K)  - that  is, effort
levels will be chosen sub-optimally,  but  given these efforts, the  parties will cooperate  (so value the
assets using W*(.)).  Let us denote this surplus, as a function of K only, by SG(K)  =  W*(eG, eGA,  K).
3.2  A-ownership
Under A-ownership.  payoffs are simply
-A  =  1W  /  +-\3WA
2  2
for G and
rA =  2W*-  1A,WA
2
The second order conditions are W,1 + AOWfGI  < 0 and W22  - A3W 2 G2  < 0 respectively.
11for A, yielding optimal effort choices  GA  and  FA that  satisfy
IWj  +  2A3WIA=1  (10)
and
2W2  -2  =  1.  (11)
The total surplus thus generated from A-ownership is SA(K)  = W* (AG,  FAA,  K).
3.3  Comparison  with  private  goods  model
Let us consider the first order condition for C's effort choice under C-ownership, (6), and write it as
IWI*  +  3GW  2 1AWG1.
In Hart's  (1995) basic model, only the  (equivalents of the) first two terms  appear  on the  left hand
side. This is because if bargaining breaks down in that  model, the  effort of one party has  no effect
on the  welfare (profit) of the  other.  However here, even when bargaining breaks  down, the  public
good nature  of each party's  action means that  the  other's  utility is affected. For exarnple, G makes
its choice assuming it gets half the increase in the gains from trade - but these gains are reduced not
only by the increase in its own outside option,  but also through  the  increase in A's outside  option
when eG increases. This helps explain also the fact that  when ,3,  =13A asset ownership has no effect
on incentives to  provide effort.  In  this  case, the  increase in G's outside  option  resulting  from an
increase in its effort is exactly offset by a reduction in the gains from trade  due to the concomitant
increase in A's outside option.
3.4  Optimal  ownership  allocation
For a fixed  level of K, the optimal ownership  structure is that which maximizes  the total surplus.
That is, G-ownership  is optimal if and only if SG(K) > SA(K).  Consider  then the case where the
central government places higher weight on the well-being of residents than  does the local authority,
12A~~~W  ~  W
-L  ---- --  1
Figure 2:
AO > 0. Figure 2 shows  the optimal effort choice  by G under the two ownership  regimes: in each
case effort is below the first best level, e*, but the marginal productivity of  eG  is higher  under
C-ownership than  under A-ownership, in accordance with condition  (4).
Figure 3 similarly shows A's effort choice under the different regimes, again under the  assumption
that  the  capital  asset  increases the  productivity  of eA (condition  (5)).  As drawn,  it  is clear that
despite the positive effect of ownership on the  productivity  of effort, A should definitely not be  given
ownership rights,  as this  reduces its  effort choice to eA, which is well below EGA.  Indeed,  as long as
A(3 >  0, A's effort choice will always be  higher under  G-ownership than  under  A-ownership.  To
ensure that  A's effort in such cases is below the  first-best  level, the following assumption  is made:
Let eA satisfy W2 (es, eA, K)  =-WX(eG,  eA, K);  then  W2* (e,FA,  K)  < 1.
We can now make the  following observations:
Proposition  1  If  AOl >  0, G's  effort  is always larger when it  owns the  asset,  and A's  is always
smaller when it does.
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Figure 3:
Proposition  2  Conversely, if AL;-  < 0, G 's effort is always smaller when it owns the asset, and A 's
is always larger when it does.
Proposition  3  Since  the two  effort levels are always below their first  best levels, it is optimal  to
assign ownership of the physical asset to the party that puts a higher weight on the well-being of local
residents.
A number of points regarding these results are worth  noting.  First, recall that  ownership alloca-
tion is used to maximize the joint  surplus of the two contracting parties,  that  is, the  local authority
and  the  central government,  and  the  well-being of local residents  only matters  (in this  model)  to
the extent  that  it enters the objective functions of these parties.  Thus the final result  above should
not necessarily be interpreted  as deriving from an external  observer's desire to maximize residents'
well-being subject  to the actions of the two parties.
Second, suppose G values residents'  well being more, so A/3 > 0.  Then even when G's effort is
relatively useless unless it is combined with both  eA  and  K,  it is still the  case that  it should own
14the  asset.  Giving the asset  to G stops A from choosing the very low effort leveA.
Finally, as a generalization of the forgoing remark, the  allocation of ownership in this  model is
less sensitive to technological parameters than  in the  standard  private goods model of Hart  (1995).
When there are no external effects of effort choice in the  event that  bargaining  breaks down, asset
ownership in general is associated with the impact of such on the productivity of effort. Here however,
no matter how small the  impact of ownership on the marginal productivity  of effort, asset ownership
is a function only of the underlying preference parameters.  This suggests a certain robustness to the
ownership assignment rule.
4  Allocation  of  tax  authority  and  financing
Decentralization is often a thinly  veiled attempt  by the central government to improve its budgetary
position, by transferring obligations for provision of services without matching  these with  sufficient
funds.  There  is generally  a  presumption  that  responsibility  for provision should  be matched  by
adequate finance and/or  responsibility to tax.  The model in this paper  can shed  light on the  role
of tax  base assignment - or more generally, the  shadow cost of public funds  - on the  allocation  of
responsibility/ownership.
Let us consider then  the  effect of alternative  tax powers on equilibrium effort provision, taking
as given the allocation  of ownership of the  capital asset, K.  Assume for concreteness that  A\3 > 0,
so the central government places a higher value on the well-being of local residents.  Figures 4 and 5
show the equilibrium effort choices,  G and  e^Ax,  where X  is the  (for now fixed) owner of the  capital
asset.  The positions of the curves Wjx and  WX are determined by, inter  alia, the  values of AG and
AA,  as seen by inspection of equations  (2) and  (3).  Because additional  effort reduces financeable
costs, the marginal return  to effort increases as A increases.
Starting  from the  position  in Figure  4,  consider a  transfer  of tax  authority  from the  central
government to the local authority  that  increases AG and reduces AA.  Assuming that  both efforts F
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Figure 4:
and e^X  were initially below their first-best levels, this transfer  of authority  unambiguously increases
the  effort of each party.  Intuition  for this  result  can be  seen from returning  to equations  (6) and
(7) and  noting  that  each  party's  effort increases (i)  as the  extent  to which  its  valuation  of local
residents'  welfare exceeds the  other's  increases, and  (ii) as the  marginal effect of its  effort increases
(WJ,  j  =  1,2).  When  AO >  0,  for G  an  increase in  the  marginal  effect of effort  is weighted
positively, and so its effort increases.  For A, the transfer of tax  authority reduces the marginal effect
of effort on non-cooperative  welfare (WX),  but  since this  is weighted negatively,  the  equilibrium
response of A  is to also increase effort.  Clearly, if Aj  were less than  zero, the  same change in tax
assignment would reduce both  parties'  equilibrium efforts. Thus we have the  following result:
Proposition  4  Tax authority should be given to the party that values the well-being of individuals
relatively less.
Coupled with our earlier result, this proposition asserts that  ownership and tax authority  should
not be allocated to the  same party.  Such a prescription  is counterintuitive  because we might think
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that  resources for provision should be  given to  the  party  that  cares more  about  quality.  But  of
course, allocation  of tax  authority  only affects ex ante  effort choices, since all financing is agreed
upon cooperatively at  the ex post stage of the  game.
Identifying  ownership of the  physical  asset  with  "expenditure  responsibility"  again highlights
the  surprising nature  of this  result.  It  is common for commentators to  call for decentralization  of
expenditure  responsibility  to be matched  with the  allocation  of a revenue source, but  the  analysis
above suggests the  opposite.  Again, this  can be  understood  by recalling that  we have assumed
that  in equilibrium the  parties  successfully negotiate  and  use the  most  efficient tax  source.  The
allocation  of tax  authority  affects incentives to provide effort only to the  extent  that  it  influences
the disagreement payoffs to each party, which are not realized in equilibrium.
175  Provision  and  ownership  of the  health  care  facility
We are now in a position  to step  back and  address questions about  the  provision of K  as well as
its ownership. This question is at  the heart of Grossman and Hart's  (1986) earlier work, and  is not
unrelated  to more recent analyses of privatization  (Hart,  Shleifer, and  Vishny (1998)) and  the role
of NGOs (Besley and  Ghatak  (1999)). I will make the assumption that  at the ex interim stage, after
the asset has been created,  the parties cannot restrain themselves from reallocating ownership of the
asset  if this  is Pareto  efficient. That  is, I will assume that  ex interim considerations determine  the
equilibrium ownership allocation, and this  cannot be altered  by a binding assignment  at the  ex ant
stage.  The essential question then  is, given the optimal identity  of the  owner of the  physical asset,
who should produce it?
At  first sight, it would appear  that  the  party  with the  lower costs of production  should  build
the  facility, and  indeed this  is true  if the  parties  can write a binding contract  specifying the  level
of investment.  However, if the  investment level is not contractible,  then assigning responsibility  for
provision is the only lever the  parties have for inducing provision.
An important  possibility that  has been introduced in related literature  is that  the  productivity  of
the physical asset may fall when transferred  from one party to the other.  For example, some authors
(e.g., Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Besley and  Ghatak  (1999)) have allowed the possibility
that  part  of the  value of the  physical asset  be embodied in the human  capital  of the  provider.  In
such cases, if the  productivity  of the  asset is reduced enough when it changes hands, then  it would
appear  that  assigning provision responsibility  to the  prospective owner is appropriate.  However,
this  assumes that  the  level of investment is the  same under both  assignments  of responsibility.  It
will be shown in  fact that  as the  cost of transferring  the  asset  increases,  it  becomes more likely
that  provision by  the  higher cost  non-owner yields a  higher investment  level.  If the  benefit  of a
an expanded  facility outweighs the additional  cost, this  may be identified as  a potential  benefit of
"participation"  at  the  project development (i.e., ex ante) stage by an otherwise inefficient party.
18To model these issues, let us assume that  it is costly to have different parties produce and own the
capital  asset, because the asset's  productivity  falls when it is not used by, or with the  cooperation
of, the provider.  Thus, suppose that  if the owner is not the  provider of the  asset, then  in the  event
that  bargaining breaks down and the parties behave non-cooperatively, the net  surplus generated is
reduced by a  fraction (1 - 6) <  1.12
For the  purposes  of exposition,  it  is useful to  impose a  little  more  structure  on  the  welfare
measures in equations (1) through (3). Specifically, let us assume that benefits and costs are separable
in K  and  the two effort inputs,  and  that  different ownership structures  only affect the  impact  of
effort. That  is, we assume (1) can be written
W*(eG, eA, K)  =  (GeG  + (*eA  + +(K)
where 0(.)  is increasing and  concave. Similarly, (2) and  (3) are assumed to reduce to
WG(eG,  eA,  K)  =  CGeG + (GeA  + aGO(K)
and
WA(eG,  eA,  K)  =  (AeG  + (AeA  +  aAq5(K)
where (*  >  ;G  >  CA, (A  >  CA >  (A,  a  G <  1 and  aA  <  1.  The idea is that  just  having the  asset
available affects the  productivity  of efforts, but  the  size of the  asset  does not.  This is an  extreme
assumption, but  it means that  I can ignore the  effect of asset size on the  ex interim effort of each
party, which simplifies the  algebra. I also ignore financing issues, by assuming a lump-sum revenue
source. Four cases can then  be analyzed in turn.
G  provision  and  G ownership
12A perhaps  more  appealing  assumption  might  be  that  the  effect  of human  capital  embodiment  is  that  when  the
asset  is transferred  from provider  to  owner,  it  is as  if the  owner  is  working  with  an asset  whose size  is reduced  by
fraction  (1 - A) <  1.  That  is, when  the  provider  transfers  an  asset  of size K,  the  new  owner  has  AK units  to  work
with.  However,  the  algebra  is  a little  simpler  with  the  assumption  that  the  effect  of the  transfer  is  on  the  surplus
generated,  and not  just  on the  input,  K.
19G's ex ante payoff is given by
pG(K) =  2W*(eG,  eA,  K)  + IAOWG(eG,  eA,  K)  -eG-  OGK,
yielding choice,  of investment  KGG  satisfyingl3
2W3  +  A,3W3G  =  OG,
which reduces to
=K  G____  ZG
2  (I +  4 aGVZG
G  provision  and  A  ownership
G's ex ante payoff is given by
pA(K)  =  2W*(e°, eo, K)  + I A6WA(eQ,  eo, K)  - e-  OGK,
yielding choice of investment  KG satisfying
2W3- +  -2  A6W3  e
or
2  (  OG+AI  tA)  A  (12)
A  provision  and  G ownership
A's ex ante payoff is given by
pAG(K)  W*(eo  , e°, K)  - Af66WG (e,  eo,  K)  - eA-  AK,
yielding choice of investment  KAG  satisfying
- W3*  AjŽ W3G  = eA
13Because  of the  additive  separability,  there  are no  8ex/OK  terms.
20or
41(K)  GA  o~~Z  (13)
2  (1  - A3aG)-A
A provision  and  A  ownership
A's ex ante payoff is given by
pAA(K)=W(e0,e',K)  - 1  \gWA(el,  eo, K)  - e-  OAK,
yielding choice of investment  KAA  satisfying
1
3 - 2A3WA  =  A
This simplifies to
41(K) _  OA  _A
2  =  (1  3aA)  - A'  (14)
As discussed above, I will make the  assumption that  it is not possible for the  parties to commit
to  an  ownership allocation  at  the  ex  ante  stage of the  relationship  that  they  will mutually  wish
to alter  at  the  ex interim  stage.  That  is, I take the  allocation  of ownership  of the  asset  as being
determined  by the  need to provide incentives for the  parties  to engage in effort at  the  ex interim
stage, as determined  by the  sign of  /,3.  It  is then straightforward  to identify the  optimal  provider
of the  capital good, conditional  on this  ownership structure.
For clarity,  let us  assume  without  loss of generality  that  AO3  >  0.  This  does not  necessarily
mean that  the  central  government should  own the  facility  at  the  ex  interim  stage,  since this  will
depend on the identity of the  provider.  In particular,  if G provides the facility, then  effort incentives
are strongest  when it retains  ownership.  However, when A provides the  facility, it is optimal  for
ownership to be transferred  to G if and only if the  costs of transferal  are small enough.  Specifically,
the asset should be  owned by G, despite being provided by A, if and only if
(G 6>
21When 6 < (*, the  cost of transfering  the  facility is high enough  that  the  improved incentives that
would otherwise exist do not  materialize.
With  this determination  of ex interim ownership we can consider the effects of different planning
provision.  If asset transfer  is costly, 6 < C*, then  the choice is between ownership and  provision by
G, and  ownership and provision by A. Comparing ZG  and  zA, it is straightforward  to show that  K
is larger under G authority  if and  only if
I-1ApaA  OA
Since p  <  1, it  is possible  that  in  order  to maximize  the  size of the  facility, G  should  be  given
planning and  expenditure  authority,  even if it has higher construction  costs.
When asset  transfer  is not so costly, that  is, 6 > (C,  G should own the  asset,  and  the  choice is
between G provision and  A provision.  By comparing zGG  and  zg,  it can be shown that  K  is larger
when chosen by G if and only if
_  A,a$G  OA
PI  1 +  Q,3ayG  - G'
This  inequality indicates  that,  conditional  on 6 being  large enough  that  G should own the  facility
(i.e., 6 > (*), as the cost of transferal increases it becomes more likely that  the identity of the provider
should differ from that  of the  owner.  This somewhat  counterintuitive  result  can be understood  by
examining  the  nature  of the  ex  post  bargaining  game.  As  6 falls, the  gains  from ex  post  trade
increase, because the surplus  generated  cooperatively  is not affected by 6, but the  non-cooperative
surplus  is reduced by  a  fraction  (1 - 6).  Now the  net  payoff to  A is equal to  its  outside  option
(6)3AWG) which falls by (1 - 6)I3AWG, plus half of the  gains  from trade  (I (W*  - 6WG))  which
increase by 2 (1-6)WG.  Thus A's payoff changes by
(  )3AWG+2(1  )W0 =  (2-3A)(1  6)W
= O(i  - 6)W 0
>  0.
22This higher payoff increases A's incentive to provide the capital good, so, ceteris paribus,  it becomes
more likely that  A's choice will be  higher than  G's.  Again, the  public  good nature  of the  output
produced  by the two parties  is of importance  for this  result.1 4
Finally, the  effect of an  increase in a G  is also to increase the  likelihood that  G should provide
the  facility.  In this  case, the  benefits of cooperation  are  relatively  small,  and  the  increase  in G s
outside option is relatively large compared with  the  increase (if any) in the  gains from trade,  thus
increasing the  private return  to G from investing in K.
6  Concluding  remarks
This paper  has attempted  to delineate a number of dimensions of decentralization  and  to formalize
notions  of participation  and  ownership in the design of health  delivery systems.  It  is motivated  in
part by the  simple observation  that  many different organizational  forms for the  delivery of health
care exist,  while their  analysis  is often descriptive  at  best.  I have employed  the  well-established
incomplete contracts  paradigm  of Hart  and  others  to examine the  organization  of health  delivery
when the inputs  of two parties  are required, but when they  are unable to  write down, and  commit
to, a binding and  complete contract  describing the actions  each should take.
The allocation of ownership of a health  care facility  (e.g., a hospital)  to the  central  government
or local authority  affects each party's  choice of ex interim effort - i.e., effort that  is required to ensure
efficient functioning of the  facility. The strong result  that  emerges is that  in order to maximize the
joint  surplus of the two parties  (which, in this model, is equivalent to the  welfare of local residents),
ownership of the  facility should be  given to the  party  that  puts  the  higher value on the  welfare of
local residents.  This result  is more robust  that  the  corresponding results  from the  standard  theory
14It should  be noted  again  that,  in  equilibrium,  the  asset will be used cooperatively,  and  the surplus  generated  will
not  be reduced  because  of the  transfer  of ownership.  Thus  it  is appropriate  to  compare  levels of capital  investment
between  ownership  structures  directly,  and  not  to  adjust  for  the  productivity  of  capital  when  transferred  (off the
equilibrium  path).
23of the firm model because of the public good nature of the output  that  is produced.  In particular,  if
ex post bargaining between the parties breaks down, each still enjoys some benefit from the other's
actions.
The second result is that  in general it is optimal to allocate tax authority  to the other party,  the
one that  values the well-being of residents less. That  is, expenditure  responsibility  (ownership) and
financing authority  should be separated.  The intuition  for this  is that  a  higher financing burden
(induced by access to a small and inefficient tax base) has the  same incentive effect on effort as does
asset ownership - both  increase the return  to effort.
Finally, the paper  examines the  situations  under which inefficient production  of the  underlying
facility at  the  ex ante stage is optimal.  That  is, can it be  desirable to induce  "participation"  by
otherwise inefficient providers?  Even if it  is costless to  transfer  ownership of the  health  facility
from the provider to the  other  party, it may  still be  true that  the  party  with  higher costs should
have authority  over the  choice of facility and  retain  ownership, instead  of  "contracting  out"  this
decision. Somewhat paradoxically, within a range of relatively low transfer costs, the more costly it
is to transfer the asset from the provider to the  owner (when they  differ), the more likely it is that
ownership and provision should be separated.
7'  References
Banerjee, Abijit (1997):  "A Theory of Misgovernance," Quarterly Journal  of Economics, 1289-
Bardhan,  Pranab  and  Dilip Mookherjee (1999):  "Relative capture  of local and  central  govern-
ments:  An essay in the  political economy of decentralization,"  mimeo, department  of economics,
University of California, Berkeley.
Besley, Timothy  and  Maitreesh Ghatak  (1999):  "Public-Private  Partnerships  for the  Provision
of Public  Goods:  Theory  and  an  Application  to NGOs in Developing Countries,"  presented  at  a
World Bank seniinar, August.
24Filmer,  Deon,  Jeffrey Hammer,  and  Lant  Pritchett  (1998):  "Health Policy in Poor  Countries:
Weak Links in the  Chain,"  Policy Research Working Paper  #  1874, World Bank.
Grossman, Sanford and  Oliver Hart  (1986):  "The Costs and  Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory
of Vertical and  Lateral  Integration,"  Journal  of Political Economy, 94(4),  691-719.
Hart,  Oliver (1995): Firms,  Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.
Hart,  Oliver, Andrei  Shleifer, and  Robert  Vishny  (1998):  'The  Proper  Scope of Government:
Theory and an  Application to Prisons,"  Quarterly Journal  of Economics,  112(4),  1119-1158.
Holmstrom,  Bengt  and  Paul  Milgrom  (1987):  "Aggregation  and  Linearity  in the  provision of
Intertemporal  Incentives," Econometrica, 55(2), 303-328.
Holmstrom,  Bengt  and  Paul  Milgrom (1991):  "Multi-task  Agency Problems,"  Journal  of Law,
Economics,  and  Organization
Mills, Anne (1994):  "Decentralization  and  accountability  in the  health  sector from an  interna-
tional perspective:  what  are the  choices?" Public Administration  and Development,  14, 281-292.
Oates,  Wallace  (1999):  "An  Essay  on  Fiscal  Federalism,"  Journal  of  Economic  Literature,
XXXVII(3), 1120-45.
Seabright,  Paul  (1996):  "Accountability and  Decentralisation  in Government:  An  Incomplete
Contracts  Model," European Economic Review, 40,  61-89.
World Bank  (1993):  World Development  Report 1993:  Investing  in Health, Oxford University
Press.
25Policy Research Working Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2378  Disintegration  and  Trade  Flows:  Simeon  Djankov  June  2000  R. Vo
Evidence  from  the Former  Soviet  Caroline  Freund  33722
Union
WPS2379  India  and  the Multilateral  Trading  Aaditya  Mattoo  June 2000  L.  Tabada
System  after Seattle:  Toward  a  Arvind  Subramanian  36896
Proactive  Role
WPS2380  Trade  Policies  for Electronic  Aaditya  Mattoo  June  2000  L.  Tabada
Commerce  Ludger  Schuknecht  36896
WPS2381  Savings  and  the  Terms  of  Trade  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  June  2000  T. Loftus
under  Borrowing  Constraints  Joshua  Aizenman  36317
WPS2382  Impediments  to the Development  and  Thorsten  Beck  June  2000  E. Mekhova
Efficiency  of Financial  Intermediation  85984
in Brazil
WPS2383  New  Firm  Formation  and  Industry  Thorsten  Beck  June  2000  E. Mekhova
Growth:  Does  Having  a Market-  or  Ross  Levine  85984
Bank-Based  System  Matter?
WPS2384  Are Cost  Models  Useful  for Telecoms Daniel  A. Benitez  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Regulators  in Developing  Countries? Antonio  Estache  36370
D. Mark  Kennet
Christian  A. Ruzzier
WPS2385  The  Rise,  the Fall,  and ...  the  Antonio Estache  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Emerging  Recovery  of Project  John Strong  36370
Finance  in  Transport
WPS2386  Regulators  and the Poor:  Lessons  Richard  Green  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
from  the United  Kingdom  36370
WPS2387  The  Long  and  Winding  Path  to Private Antonio  Estache  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Financing  and  Regulation  of  Toll  Manuel  Romero  36370
Roads  John  Strong
WPS2388  The  Role  of Special  and  Differential  Constantine  Michalopoulos  July 2000  L.  Tabada
Treatment  for Developing  Countries  in  36896
GATT  and  the World  Trade  Organization
WPS2389  Vietnam:  On  the Road  to Labor-  Patrick  Belser  July 2000  H. Sutrisna
Intensive  Growth?  88032
WPS  2390  The  Social  Rate  of  Return  on  David  Canning  July  2000  H. Sladovich
Infrastructure  Investments  Esra  Bennathan  37698Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2391  Are the Poor  Protected  from Budget  Martin  Ravallion  July 2000  P. Sader
Cuts?  Theory  and Evidence  for  33902
Argentina
WPS2392  What  Factors  Appear  to Drive  Private  Dipak  Dasgupta  July 2000  S.  Crow
Capital  Flows  to Developing  Countries?  Dilip  Ratha  30763
And How  Does  Official  Lending
Respond?
WPS2393  Will the Euro  Trigger  More  Monetary  Patrick  Honohan  July 2000  A. Yaptenco
Unions  in Africa?  Philip  R. Lane  31823
WPS2394  Tax Evasion,  Corruption,  and the  Waly  Wane  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Remuneration  of Heterogeneous  37658
Inspectors